Given the obvious dangers of climate change, the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference requires social theorists to investigate reasons for the breakdown that go beyond pointing out the fear of change, describing denial, talking of conflict between particular power-blocks, demanding justice, or positing that the ruling class is determined to make money at the expense of the ecological system and their own survival. If we are to talk of 'interests' we need to talk of how people come to know their interests, and how they frame the world so as to make those interests seem real and possible. In taking this step we move into the interwoven realms of cosmology and psychology. I assume that human social dynamics grows out of the nature of human being and cannot be completely abstracted away from that being. At the same time I want to be attentive to matters arising around 'disorder,' so that disorder is not considered a residue, a pathology, or something to be bypassed as inessential. Disorder is at the heart of our problem and needs to be part of our theory. This essay looks at responses to climate change as psycho-social responses mediated through myth and disordered networks. It begins with an account of editing a book on climate change (Marshall 2009), and takes the insights from this process to an analysis of the Copenhagen conference and its aftermath. Within the international process, I
semi-contingent, network, woven out of other ties-in other words the network existed for a function and was likely to break when the function was fulfilled or failed. This temporariness is common in contemporary social formation. It was not an ordered network, nor a resilient network, simply the thrum of the potential book, without which the book would not exist and of which the book is the trace; itself a thrum of this passing network. I would suggest that this temporary thrumming, (edges, passing knots and resonance) is the way we generally act together in contemporary western society, while nostalgically or projectively (paranoically) thinking others act in a more orderly, coordinated, or rigid manner.
This formation had a temporary hub in myself and the Jung Society. This hubbing had something of a radial formation. Some of the contacts continued in other forms later, or carried on, in a slightly transformed manner the loose ties previously existing. Thrums that persisted perhaps-of which new orders were made and then left no trace? It faded in and out like a wave on other waves.
Although it is tempting to claim networks are orders, they are often at best temporary, hidden orders, easily broken by even one person. The knot holding it all together gets cut and the weaving unravels. The more central the knot or the person the more it unravels, or the more it separates into other parts. Networks are hard to rescue once broken. They need endless maintenance and repair to keep existing, so as not to fragment into individual threads, or rather for the threads not to be caught in other projects and pulled apart. Gaps and forgetting occurred, people who should have been asked were not; the consequences never certain. It would seem especially that networks are always unravelling themselves as well as being unravelled by others. In Copenhagen the powerful also found that sociality slips away, hanging into nothingness. Power relations are a network, with pathways and patterns which are easily triggered, yet always unstable, so we can never tell where the unravelling will begin.
In this weaving we also have the shifting thrums of sense-making, of bodily stolidity, symbols and psychology-a base perhaps, or just a bass line, figured but improvised, depending on what comes next from the others thrumming along.
Then the book network started to get complicated in a repetitiously disordered manner-the interference became the thing or, again, the thrum that made the process. PORTAL, vol. 8, no. 3, September 2011. 6 Most of the contributors seemed concerned about climate change. Many of them showed, what seemed to me, a surprising familiarity with official reports and public science-more surprising still given the 'anti-science,' poetic and religious bent of a fair number of those contributors. The contradictions, or edges of disturbance, emerge continuously. Many of the contributors, including myself, repeatedly felt themselves being called to write, but blocked as to the actual writing in many different ways. In some cases people had to drop out as other things took greater precedence, or their lives were consumed by chaos and other networks. This is, of course, what you expect.
Nobody ever finds editing a collection is smooth, especially with a one-year deadline, but we composed a collection of people who were aware of the importance of the issues they were supposed to conceive, but many of whom found speaking or writing close to impossible. They were often stuck, and stuck quite badly. The binary seems to be marked here. Whichever 'side' we are on, we have to be both right and righteous-and while 'side' does not have to be binary, it usually falls that way for us. Politics ideally has two sides, so does football; in business it tends to be 'us'
versus the world-which it would seem already stacks 'the world' up as an enemy, to preserve the order that orders us.
Morality slides in, in other ways as well. As writers, people involved in the project often seemed swayed by morals or common sense, knotting beneath and making linkages between symbols. Sometimes the argument seemed to be that climate change is bad and therefore we should change our behaviour (and this from depth psychologists-if only therapy was that easy). Sometimes the argument seemed to be that as climate change was bad then our behaviour might change automatically.
These arguments and repetitions, by naming the iniquity, could be seen to be attempts at creating unity both in ego and group simultaneously, by finding or making an evil or an immoral other, and expelling it by making a scapegoat and turning it to thrum. Once the scapegoat, whether internal or external, was gone then all would be well, at least until the pattern perishes. Morals are an ordering (which often prevents exploration) and which require things to fall out of them to be condemned and prove those morals worthwhile: this is the pattern of justice. However, with morals the psyche could pretend to harmony, the ego would be temporarily safe, at least until the ritual could be performed again. But each time is different, and the cutting of the weaving to finish off, leaves remains behind-it is not whole cloth, our disorder is not gone. We could reduce our emissions to zero and China would make up the difference in less than a year given its increasing rate of emissions' (Abbott 2009 Everyone has different notions of justice, but each surely thinks that they are just and the others criminal. Justice, indeed, requires a criminal other-which is always likely to make some people nervous and attack in return. By demanding a scapegoat, it also panders to our own 'shadows,' our own ego defences and blindness. We also have to Justice demands that all worldviews and social formations are uniform, or else it risks being unjust; yet without recognising that forms of life conflict, it cannot deal with reality. Choosing justice as the rubric for action, is possibly better than choosing the myth of apocalypse, because apocalypse immobilises altogether, but it does not let us deal with the mess of climate or power relations. Justice requires a unity and coordination which has not yet been woven, and cannot be built out of the clash without risking war.
Copenhagen itself
Before we even get to the likely impossibility of anyone weaving an all-encompassing plan out of the Copenhagen meeting, we need to look at the complexity of the patterns of participation-the mess, the knots and thrum without a pattern. This account is something of a broken patchwork of presentation but it expresses the reports; and the expression of that disorder is more necessary than use of unexamined assumptions that the truth is whole and hidden.
There were a total of 194 registered State parties to the conference, with 10,583
delegates. There were another two observer States, 900 registered observer organisations with a further 13,482 participants and another 3,221 media people (UNFCCC 2010: 2 The recognised power blocks at the Conference were:
 The G-77, a loose coalition of 131 "developing nations," including China, India, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Sudan, Cuba, Papua New Guinea and Saudi Arabia.  The 41 Industrialised (Annex 1) countries. Annex 1 was defined in earlier treaties. It not only includes the USA, Australia, the UK, Germany, Japan, Russia etc, but Liechtenstein, Bulgaria, Estonia and Romania and other relatively poor small states. At the United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, it was agreed that only these countries had to reduce emissions.  The 38 Small Island Developing States who make up about 20 percent of the UN general assembly, with another 14 non-UN members.  The least developed countries bloc.  And, the OPEC block, which could be expected to oppose any limits on selling oil.  Some sources also mention an African climate-negotiating group headed by Ethiopia.
On top of this there were simultaneous international activist forums, the most notable being the Klimaforum09, again with a roughly joined patchwork of players. George Monbiot (2010) commented:
I came back from the Copenhagen climate talks depressed for several reasons, but above all because, listening to the discussions at the citizens' summit, it struck me that we no longer have movements; we have thousands of people each clamouring to have their own visions adopted. We might come together for occasional rallies and marches, but as soon as we start discussing alternatives, solidarity is shattered by possessive individualism.
There was also the so-called Climate Group, which focused on a meeting of regional governments with at least 60 premiers, governors and ministers, featuring Al Gore, Two Copenhagen climate conferences took place last week…. The conference I attended used science to understand the past, present environments and pollution. This was essentially unreported because journalists are scientific illiterates and this is not sensational news … The other conference, the UN's political conference, is about the redistribution of your money through sticky fingers.
The tearing web
While there are 'ecological' connections between all these people, there are not going to be 'human' connections; the sheer numbers and potential differences involved have to be acknowledged. There are few simple coherent networks here. These are knots without a visible tapestry. So not only do people face the kind of psycho-social disruption we have discussed, but it is likely that groups will fragment, networks dissolve, and alliances will fracture, making little basis for mutually agreed justice.
For example, there are obvious overlaps in block membership; the categories are not coherent or mutually exclusive. India and China are not easily classified as 'developing' or powerless when compared to some Annex 1 countries. China is somewhere between the second and third largest economy in the world with a GDP of close to US$8 trillion, Tuvalu's GDP is US$15 million (Borofsky et al. 2009 ). Estonia, an Annex 1 country has a GDP of less than US$22 billion. Annex 1 countries don't have much in common, or many historical unities, but the most obvious conflict amongst them over reduction targets was between the USA and the EU. Conflicts also manifested between relatively poor States with large forests (Papua New Guinea and Indonesia) and those without, as REDD proposals are of little use if you have no industrial emissions, limited agricultural emissions or no forests. The small island states argued that they faced destruction with the treaties being proposed, and broke with China and India. Venezuela and Bolivia, seemed to consider themselves a separate independent Marxist block, but Venezuela is an oil producer. Categories like 'West' and 'the rest,' or 'North' and 'South,' don't begin to capture the complex patterns of alliance and fracture manifested here or, perhaps more importantly, the potential change in the world's power balance. The USA has in less than twenty years gone from being the world's only unchallengeable superpower, to a troubled player amongst many.
Furthermore, countries themselves were not coherent. Members on both sides of the US Senate were openly opposed to restrictions on US activities. The conservative Opposition in Australia opposed the Government's scheme for carbon reduction as did the Greens. There was a vocal and popular 'climate sceptic' movement in the USA, Australia and the UK supported by much of the mainstream media, which was largely hostile to any action at all; it can be seen in any online newspaper article of the period that allows comments. Frequently sceptics argue that action hurting the economy would hurt the poor and cost jobs, and thus, by implication, be unjust.
There was no web at the conference, only potentials and broken patterns. One of the problems that arose repeatedly was the problem of sovereignty. Climate change cannot be solved nationally and thus it changes the relationships between states. India and China objected strongly to the idea of their emission cuts being inspected, just as much as the USA objected to other states putting limits on them. There is a suspicion of unjust freeloading by others, which implies that generous actions would be unfairly exploited.
The same fragility exists elsewhere; even in an era which has celebrated neo-liberalist 'free trade,' it is notable that multi-party trade talks have continually broken down, and Confusion is not only present in the interactions. Process is also confused. Thus in one article from 6 December environmentalist Bill McKibben argued that climate change was unlike other political problems in that it could not be solved by incrementalism: the adversary here is not Republicans, or socialists, or deficits, or taxes, or misogyny, or racism, or any of the problems we normally face-adversaries that can change over time, or be worn down, or disproved, or cast off. The adversary here is physics … physics doesn't just impose a bottom line, it imposes a time limit. This is like no other challenge we face because every year we don't deal with it, it gets much, much worse, and then, at a certain point, it becomes insoluble. (McKibben 2009a) A mere four days later, perhaps faced with deadlock, he compared climate change to the fight for health care in the USA, and said that something is better than nothing (McKibben 2009b).
Demands
I do not want to reiterate the science here, as that is well known. What is significant is that the Small Island States captured a large amount of publicity for their plight, and for demands that temperature rises should be kept to less than 2 degrees Centigrade and CO 2 be restricted to 350 parts per million or less. This was never going to be agreed to by the big emitters, such as the USA and China. One commentator wrote:
The dispute is fundamental because the amount of greenhouse gases already in the air condemns the world to an increase of at least 1.5 degrees. Meeting the victims' demand, therefore, would mean either stopping all emissions immediately, which would be impossible, or reducing them much faster than expected and finding a way of getting carbon dioxide out of the air. (Lean 2009) We are arguing as the world weave tears.
Conference moods
The conference moods and conflicts display the psychological processes. Geoffrey Lean stated that the conference 'started in a more optimistic frame of mind than any I can remember in four decades of similarly tricky negotiations' (Lean 2009 backed by China, India-and Brazil, which Denmark has viewed as an ally' (Rothenberg et al. 2009 ).
This fragmentation of expected alliances and organisation could be expected to produce paranoia-like analysis. The release of emails hacked from the East Anglia Climatic Research Unit, which allowed climate sceptics to claim climate science was 'cooked,' led UN officials to claim the hackers were probably paid to undermine the Copenhagen summit (Totaro 2009 ). Similarly, a day after the conference started, there was a leaked document: 'a secret draft agreement worked on by a group of individuals known as 'the circle of commitment'-but understood to include the UK, US and Denmark [which] has only been shown to a handful of countries since it was finalised this week' (Vidal 2009a ). The document was supposed to indicate that the agreement had already been stitched up, and that the conference was to hand power to the 'rich countries.' Fury was expressed at the document. One anonymous diplomat said: 'Clearly the intention is to get Obama and the leaders of other rich countries to muscle it through when they arrive next week. It effectively is the end of the UN process' (Vidal 2009a 
Marian Wilkinson reported further fears:
We've been told by negotiators here that there is a fear from the Chinese and the Indians. They fear that the verification measures put in place could be used against them, especially by the US Congress, also perhaps by some of the European parliaments, to impose carbon tariffs on them; that this will be used as a weapon to slug them in the international trade sphere ('Crunch Time' 2009).
India's Environment Minister, Jairam Ramesh, accused Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of lying about his position on climate change and pulled out of a meeting with Australian Climate Change Minister Penny Wong. She reportedly said that 'she did not know why Mr Ramesh pulled out of the crucial meeting. "You will have to ask him'" (Wilkinson 2009 ). Ramesh claimed he had been too busy. Ramesh also called Australia an ayatollah for wanting a single treaty to bind everyone (Wilkinson 2009 ). In other talks, members of the G77 walked out to protest about the apparent abandonment of the Kyoto Protocol, and Australia 'then shut down the talks on emission cuts for rich countries' (Wilkinson 2009 ). About the same time, Lumumba Di-Aping, a Sudanese diplomat who was the official chief negotiator for the G77 group, said: 'The message Kevin Rudd is giving to his people, his citizens, is a fabrication, it's fiction' (Alberici 2009 ). After the event, a journalist asked Penny Wong if she got 'the feeling that India is really boasting that it has sort of put one over the larger nations?' (Wong 2009 ).
Reports of the final day of negotiation suggest that there was a clash between China and the USA, in particular, and that there was also an attempt to generate a sub-conference to make things more controllable. A Guardian report claimed that after 'eight draft texts and all-day talks between 115 world leaders, it was left to Barack Obama and Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier, to broker a political agreement' (Vidal 2009b ). The Independent reported that the 'day's most remarkable feature was a direct and unprecedented personal clash between … Barack Obama, and … Wen Jiabao' (McCarthy 2009b) . The reporter explains the clash as stemming from Obama's public insistence that the Chinese should allow their announced cuts to be inspected, and that without such verification an agreement was worthless. Wen sent subordinates to all further meetings and Obama was deeply annoyed (McCarthy 2009b) . If this were the case, then this was not a new demand. Many Annex 1 countries wanted everyone to make cuts and have them verified; it could seem the Chinese were 'seeking' to be insulted and insulting.
People were not happy with the process of the final day. Journalist George Monbiot said:
Obama went behind the backs of the UN and most of its member states and assembled a coalition of the willing to strike a deal that outraged the rest of the world. This was then presented to poorer nations without negotiation: either they signed it or they lost the adaptation funds required to help them survive the first few decades of climate breakdown. (Monbiot 2009) Richard Black of the BBC, agreed that the deal was struck behind closed doors: 'The end of the meeting saw leaders of the US and the BASIC group of countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) hammering out a last-minute deal in a back room as though the nine months of talks leading up to this summit, and the Bali Action Plan to which they had all committed two years previously, did not exist' (Black 2009 ). The most detailed account of part of the final day was given by Mark Lynas (2009) , the climate advisor to Mohamed Nasheed, the President of the Maldives. He said about 50-60 people were in the room, and that Wen Jiabao did not attend. The Chinese insisted that the previously agreed upon 2050 targets be taken out of the deal: '"Why can't we even mention our own targets?" demanded a furious Angela Merkel. Australia's prime minister, Kevin Rudd, was annoyed enough to bang his microphone.' (Lynas 2009 ).
The Chinese further insisted that statements that emissions should peak by 2020 be removed:
[T]he Chinese delegate [also] insisted on removing the 1.5C target so beloved of the small island states and low-lying nations who have most to lose from rising seas. President Nasheed of the Maldives, supported by [Gordon] Brown, fought valiantly to save this crucial number. "How can you ask my country to go extinct?" demanded Nasheed. The Chinese delegate feigned great offence-and the number stayed, but surrounded by language which makes it all but meaningless. (Lynas 2009) Later on, Kevin Rudd said:
At about one o'clock this morning in Copenhagen, after seventeen hours straight of negotiation today, we agreed on a Copenhagen Accord on climate change. This was agreed in a negotiating group of about twenty-five nations … This last round of negotiations with that group began at 11pm last night. It ran through to three this morning, with myself in attendance, and then Penny Wong remained through the night. I resumed at 8am this morning and we have just concluded at 1am the next day. It has been a long day … The truth is, as of twenty four hours ago, these negotiations stood at a point of complete collapse. (Rudd 2009c) With this level of exhaustion, it is improbable that anyone was thinking straight. Obama left immediately, ironically and officially because of weather issues, but leaving distanced him, or attempted to distance him, from the mess of the involvement and the potential insecurity of his position, when not backed by Congress. Networks fractured, and perhaps had little chance of holding the threads of coherent constructive power in these psychosocial circumstances; unthreading was more likely.
Aftermath
John Sauven, executive director of Greenpeace UK, said: 'The city of Copenhagen is a crime scene tonight, with the guilty men and women fleeing to the airport' (Vidal 2009b) . Lumumba Di-Aping, chairman of the G77, and thus notionally a supporter of continuing Chinese emissions, stated that the agreement 'is asking Africa to sign a suicide pact, an incineration pact in order to maintain the economic dependence of a few countries. It's a solution based on values that funnelled six million people in Europe into furnaces' (Batty 2009 ).
Indian and Chinese representatives tried to explain the breakdown in unity, and their power, in the G77 by conspiracy:
"There have been some efforts to deliberately divide us," one of the senior Chinese negotiators, Qingtai Yu told the BBC. "We have seen such moves here and this is nothing new" … An Indian negotiator echoed the same message, adding, "In fact some of the poor countries have been threatened (by some developed countries not to toe the line of the G77) and we know there will be many such efforts" … "The allegation that we are trying to divide them is baseless and incomprehensible," said Karl Falkenberg, a representative of the European Commission. "You can see how divided they are on issues like average temperature rise and blaming us for that state does no good." (Khadka 2009) The Guardian reported that a Chinese government think tank reinforced Chinese conclusions after the talks: '"A conspiracy by developed nations to divide the camp of developing nations [was] a success," it said, citing the Small Island States' demand that … Brazil, South Africa, India, China … impose mandatory emission reductions' (Watts et al. 2010 ).
Mark Lynas, climate advisor to the President of the Maldives, said in response:
It's astonishing that this document suggests the Chinese really believe the absurd conspiracy theory that small island states were being played like puppets by rich countries. The truth is that the small island states and most vulnerable countries want China and its allies to cut their emissions because without these cuts they will not survive. Bluntly put, China is the world's No1 emitter, and if China does not reduce its emissions by at least half by mid-century, then countries like the Maldives will go under. (Watts et al. 2010) I'm not entirely convinced that UK Prime Minster Gordon Brown was not right to say: 'This is the first step we are taking towards a green and low-carbon future for the world, steps we are taking together. But like all first steps, the steps are difficult and they are hard' (Batty 2009 ). Perhaps too much was expected, and expectations also disrupted the process.
In March 2010 it was reported that:
Many countries resented that it had been thrashed out and imposed on them outside the formal UN negotiation process. But 114 countries have backed up their initial support by formally associating themselves with the accord and 74 have submitted targets to cut or slow greenhouse gas emissions. Nearly 80 per cent of the world's emissions are included. (Morton 2010a) In June 2010 claims were made that China's leaders were preparing 'the ground to exceed China's pledge to reduce carbon emissions intensity by 40 to 45 per cent by 2020" (Garnaut 2010) . Advice from the Australian Department of Climate Change suggested that 'steps being taken by China might be equivalent to Australia cutting emissions by 25 per cent" (Morton 2010b ). China cannot be accused of simple reluctance and resistance; things are much messier than that. In terms of comparative complexity we need to remember that the Kyoto accord was initially signed as a framework in 1997. Reports of the Tianjin conference, which appeared as I wrote the first draft of this essay (October 2010), suggest that the fracture, weaving and unravelling, the discarding and the felting, the ordered and the contingent, the distress and cries of injustice, continue to have play and will not fall into a simple order. Yet out of the chaos has come something, the thrum has become felt. Perhaps it is not useful, and perhaps it will be unthreaded, perhaps it did not matt thoroughly enough, but at the same time this disorder and dismembering is part of the politics and part of the social process and cannot be ignored by attempting to render what happened simple and coherent.
Conclusion and suggestions
This paper has attempted to show that disorder is inherent in climate change and our psychosocial responses to it. With climate change, our certainties, alliances and social categories breakdown, as do the ways we organise our egos and our realities. The metaphor of thrum allows play with the intertwined mess and order, and shows that disorder cannot be ignored. Networks, personal and political tend to be fragile. Use of power disorders as much as it orders. Old guiding myths such as Justice are no longer useful for ordering this course of events. Justice fails because it seeks a scapegoat, demands elimination of disorder and requires a uniformity, agreement and enforcement that cannot be present.
On the other hand, disorder can be a sign of something neglected, of the unconscious or the unknown, as well as of a burgeoning creativity that can look like vandalism. Depth psychology suggests that it is useful to listen to the disorder rather than discard it. It suggests that, with listening, this disorder can be symbolically synthesised with one's ordering, so as to produce a new state that allows the person, or group, to better deal with their problems. This renders disorder, no longer simply disorder but something symbolically conceivable, or recognisable, which is neither obstacle nor discard.
Disorder is no longer trash, but incorporated, transformed, as part of the pattern. Depth psychology does not claim to know what this new order is in advance; that has to be formed, and uncertainty accepted during this process. The new order does not mean that there is no longer disorder. Disorder is always present because our conceptual apparatus is always limited, and there is always something left over. Just as we cannot describe anything completely in a finite period of time, so we cannot order everything. We can only work within the limits of what is orderable at the time, hoping for a minimum of relevant or repressed disorder. We move from one disorder to the next, which hopefully will test out as more adaptive and more moral.
Rather than demanding fairness and justice, perhaps we can ask all who are concerned to act now, to cut back emissions, to find new lives and morals which apply to them rather than are demanded of others. This is not denying the social power in a group of people moving together, but a wariness of a group that exists against another. Such a group will create this 'other' and is likely to unconsciously become it. Similarly we can ask people to respect the disorder of reality; not to demand or rush to an order which is not present, but rather to seek to listen to the thrumming, however much it appears to be part of the background, the mess, or the breakdown. We may likewise need to learn how to deal with disordered, fragmentary and fragile networks, as opposed to ordered institutions, and to keep them unravelling long enough to serve their momentary purpose.
Calling for ourselves and our leaders to listen to disorder rather than demanding certainty and ultimatums, may seem as impractical as calling for Justice, but it may also be less destructive and more productive of new solutions which are not locked into our current ways of being and relations of power.
